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How consciousness is generated by the nervous system remains one of the greatest
mysteries in science. Investigators from diverse ﬁelds have begun to unravel this puzzle
by contrasting conscious and unconscious processes. In this way, it has been revealed
that the two kinds of processes differ in terms of the underlying neural events and
associated cognitive mechanisms. We propose that, for several reasons, the olfactory
system provides a unique portal through which to examine this contrast. For this
purpose, the olfactory system is beneﬁcial in terms of its (a) neuroanatomical aspects,
(b) phenomenological and cognitive/mechanistic properties, and (c) neurodynamic (e.g.,
brain oscillations) properties. In this review, we discuss how each of these properties
and aspects of the olfactory system can illuminate the contrast between conscious
and unconscious processing in the brain. We conclude by delineating the most fruitful
avenues of research and by entertaining hypotheses that, in order for an olfactory
content to be conscious, that content must participate in a network that is large-
scale, both in terms of the neural systems involved and the scope of information
integration.
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consciousness
INTRODUCTION
How consciousness is generated by the nervous system remains
one of the greatest mysteries in science (Crick and Koch, 2003;
Roach, 2005): “No one has produced any plausible explanation
as to how the experience of [anything]. . . could arise from the
actions of the brain” (Crick and Koch, 2003, p. 119). Researchers
fromdiverse ﬁelds have begun to unravel this puzzle by contrasting
conscious and unconscious processes (Shallice, 1972; Logothetis
and Schall, 1989; Crick andKoch, 1995; Kinsbourne, 1996;Wegner
and Bargh, 1998; Grossberg, 1999; Di Lollo et al., 2000; Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001; Baars, 2002, 2005; Gray, 2004; Libet, 2004;
Laureys, 2005; Morsella, 2005; Merker, 2007; Doesburg et al.,
2009; Damasio, 2010; Boly et al., 2011; Panagiotaropoulos et al.,
2012). Through this contrastive approach, it has been revealed
that the two kinds of processes differ in terms of the underlying
neural events and associated cognitive mechanisms (see conclu-
sions of this contrast in Godwin et al., 2013). (For discussion of
the limitations of contrastive approaches, see Aru et al., 2012.) It
has been proposed that, for several reasons, the olfactory system
provides a unique portal through which to examine this con-
trast (Morsella et al., 2010; Keller, 2011). For this purpose, the
olfactory system is beneﬁcial in terms of its (a) neuroanatomical
aspects, (b) phenomenological and cognitive/mechanistic prop-
erties, and (c) neurodynamic (e.g., brain oscillations) properties.
In the three sections below, we discuss how each of these prop-
erties and aspects of the olfactory system can illuminate the
contrast between conscious and unconscious processing in the
brain.
NEUROANATOMY
When reverse engineering a complex phenomenon, it is best to
focus on the simplest manifestation of that phenomenon. For
example, when investigating the neural correlates of conscious-
ness, it is more fruitful to focus on primitive states such as pain,
the perception of a tone, or the smell of a rose than to focus on
more elaborate and, in terms of cognitive processing, more mul-
tifaceted states, such as nostalgia and, say, an appreciation of the
narrative structure of a novel. From this reductionistic standpoint,
wepropose that the best system for investigating theneuroanatom-
ical correlates of consciousness is that of olfaction (Freeman,
2007a; Freeman and Quian Quiroga, 2013). To appreciate this
proposal, it is necessary to ﬁrst apprehend the neuroanatomy of
olfaction. Hence, we now present a brief, selective review of the
neuroanatomy of the olfactory system, with an emphasis on the
regions most pertinent to the study of consciousness. (For a more
thorough review of the olfactory system, see Neville and Haberly,
2004; Shepherd et al., 2004.)
Olfaction, perhaps the phylogenetically oldest sensorymodality
(Hosek and Freeman, 2001), is unique among sensory modalities
in its anatomical organization (Price, 1990; Freeman, 2007a). Most
notably, unlike other sensory modalities (e.g., vision, audition, or
touch), bottom-up afference from the olfactory receptors bypasses
the thalamic “ﬁrst-order” relay neurons (Sherman and Guillery,
2006) and directly inﬂuences a region of the ipsilateral cortex
(Shepherd and Greer, 1998; Tham et al., 2009), called the olfactory
(piriform) cortex (Haberly, 1998; Mori et al., 1999; Neville and
Haberly, 2004; Gottfried andZald,2005). Speciﬁcally, after sensory
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transduction in the olfactory epithelium of the nose, olfactory
afference undergoes sophisticated processing in the olfactory bulb,
a structure that can generate complex patterns of activation across
neural populations, which are used for the encoding of odorants
(Freeman, 1987; Xu et al., 2000). While historically the olfactory
bulb was compared to the retina (Ramón y Cajal, 1909–1911), it
has been proposed more recently that the primary function car-
ried out by the bulb is similar to the primary function carried
out by the ﬁrst-order relay thalamus (e.g., the lateral geniculate
nucleus) in other sensorymodalities (e.g., vision):“both structures
act as a bottleneck that is a target for various modulatory inputs,
and this arrangement enables efﬁcient control of information
ﬂow before cortical processing occurs” (Kay and Sherman, 2007,
p. 47).
After processing in the bulb, olfactory afference is processed in
the piriform (meaning, “pear-shaped”) cortex. The piriform cor-
tex is considered to be part of the“primary olfactory cortex,”which
also includes the olfactory tubercle, the periamygdaloid cortex, the
lateral entorhinal cortex, the cortical portion of the amygdaloid
nuclei, the ventral tenia teat, and the nucleus of the lateral olfac-
tory tract (Carmichael et al., 1994; Tham et al., 2009). Piriform
cortex is a phylogenetically old type of cortex, hence the name-
sake of this kind of cortex, paleocortex. Paleocortex contains only
three cortical layers, which stands in contrast to neocortex, which
contains six layers. (It is worth noting that the analogous cortical
regions for the modalities of vision and audition consist, not of
paleocortex, but of neocortex.) Interestingly, though paleocortex
is less complex than neocortex, it still shares remarkable similar-
ities with the neocortex, in terms of physiology, neurochemistry,
and local circuitry (Haberly, 1998). Thus, by studying this possi-
bly more simple form of cortex, one can learn a great deal about
neocortex.
Despite the relative simplicity of the piriform cortex, it has been
suggested that the anatomical connectivity of the posterior piri-
form may allow it to perform complex operations such as learning,
memory retrieval, and other associative functions (Haberly, 1998).
Indeed, a study of odor learning in humans revealed that learning-
induced neural plasticity is observed in the posterior piriform
cortex in a fashion similar to that found in a higher cortical
region involved in olfaction, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Li
et al., 2006). The piriform cortex may also have a role in the seem-
ing stability of odor perception through stimulus generalization
(Barnes et al., 2008; Sela and Sobel, 2010). Ensembles of neurons
in the piriform cortex respond similarly to a mix of odors and to
the same mix of odors when one odor is removed, but they will
respond differently if one of the odors is replaced by a novel odor
(Barnes et al., 2008).
Two main output pathways carry odor information from the
piriform cortex to other brain regions. The ﬁrst output pathway
targets subcortical limbic regions (e.g., the hypothalamus) that are
involved in motivational, emotional, and homeostatic responses
to odors. The second output stream from the piriform cortex
targets neocortex (Tham et al., 2009). This output stream to the
neocortex can be further broken down into two distinct path-
ways (Tanabe et al., 1975). The primary (direct) pathway projects
from pyramidal cells in the piriform cortex directly to the OFC
and is considered the chief pathway for odor information to be
transmitted to neocortical areas (Yarita et al., 1980; Carmichael
et al., 1994; Haberly, 1998). The secondary (indirect) pathway
originates from a relatively small number of cells in the piriform
cortex and projects to the OFC through the mediodorsal thala-
mic nucleus (MDNT). This pathway consists of only sparse ﬁber
density (Price and Slotnick, 1983;Haberly, 1998; Ongür and Price,
2000; see also Poo and Isaacson, 2009).
As noted, the indirect pathway, involving the MDNT, has
sparse ﬁber density compared to the direct monosynaptic path-
way. Despite its sparse ﬁber density, there is evidence that
this pathway may be involved in signiﬁcant olfactory process-
ing. For example, patients with damage to the MDNT show
deﬁcits in odor identiﬁcation, discrimination, and hedonics (Pot-
ter and Butters, 1980; Sela et al., 2009). Furthermore, bilateral
thalamic infarctions yield sudden, transient abnormalities in con-
sciously experienced odor perception (Asai et al., 2008). There
has also been an argument for the involvement of the MDNT
in olfactory attention (Plailly et al., 2008). Based on these ﬁnd-
ings, one can tentatively conclude that the MDNT is neither
necessary nor sufﬁcient for conscious olfactory experience, but
that it may play a role in olfactory identiﬁcation, discrimina-
tion, and hedonics, as well as in the orienting of olfactory
attention.
The OFC is the principal neocortical region for olfactory pro-
cessing. It performs associative roles in olfactory information
processing (Gottfried and Zald, 2005) and carries out multisen-
sory integration (Rolls and Baylis, 1994). For example, it is in
the OFC that inputs from gustation, olfaction, somatosensation,
audition, and vision combine to create the multimodal percep-
tion of ﬂavor (Rolls and Baylis, 1994; Shepherd, 2006). The OFC
seems to play a particularly important role in primate cognition
(Tanabe et al., 1975) and occupies a role in “central processing.”
It has been demonstrated that the magnitude of OFC activation
(but not that of piriform cortex) predicts the degree of subsequent
improvement in an olfactory judgment task (Li et al., 2006).
In summary, unlike most other sensory modalities, afferents
from the olfactory sensory system (a) bypass the ﬁrst-order, relay
thalamus, (b) directly target the cortex ipsilaterally (Shepherd
and Greer, 1998; Tham et al., 2009), which minimizes spread of
circuitry, (c) involve a primary processing area that consists of
paleocortex (which contains only half of the number of layers of
neocortex), and (d) involve primarily only one brain region (the
frontal cortex; Shepherd, 2007). The last observation stands in
contrast to vision and audition, which often involve large-scale
interactions between frontal cortex and parietal cortices, as in the
case of the well-documented interactions between frontal-parietal
cortex or frontal-occipital cortex. This summary reveals the rela-
tive simplicity of the anatomy of the olfactory system compared to
that of other systems. In addition, it has been claimed that, because
of its positioning within the cranium, the olfactory system features
a privileged and accessible region (Shepherd and Greer, 1998). As
Shepherd (2007) concludes, “In olfactory perception there is no
‘back’ of the brain; the primary neocortical receptive area is in the
OFC, which is at the core of the prefrontal area. Thus, in olfac-
tion, all of the sequences of processing that are necessary to get
from the back to the front of the brain are compressed within the
front of the brain itself. This reﬂects the evolutionary position of
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smell, with its privileged input to the highest centers of the frontal
lobe throughout the evolution of the vertebrate brain. From this
perspective, the basic architecture of the neural basis of conscious-
ness in mammals, including primates, should be sought in the
olfactory system, with adaptations for the other sensory path-
ways reﬂecting their relative importance in the different species”
(p. 93).
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSCIOUSNESS
We now discuss the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the
neuroanatomyof olfactory consciousness. First,wediscuss the role
of the most peripheral anatomical structures: the olfactory epithe-
lium and olfactory bulb. Regarding the latter, previous ﬁndings
suggest that the olfactory bulb is unnecessary for endogenic olfac-
tory consciousness (Mizobuchi et al., 1999; Henkin et al., 2000).
(Again, the bulb has been described as being functionally equiv-
alent to the ﬁrst-order relay of the thalamus; Kay and Sherman,
2007; see also Murakami et al., 2005.) This observation is consis-
tent with ﬁndings from research on the neural correlates of various
kinds of conscious olfactory experiences, including olfactory per-
ceptions, olfactory imagery, and olfactory hallucinations (Markert
et al., 1993; Mizobuchi et al., 1999; Leopold, 2002). This research,
which includes neuroimaging studies (Henkin et al., 2000), exper-
iments involving direct stimulation of the brain (Penﬁeld and
Jasper, 1954), and lesion studies (Mizobuchi et al., 1999), sug-
gests that endogenic, olfactory consciousness does not require
the olfactory bulb. Perhaps most critically, it seems that patients
with bilateral olfactory bulbectomies can still experience explicit,
olfactory memories, suggesting that, under certain circumstances,
these peripheral structures are not necessary for the instantiation
of these kinds of conscious representations. However, the cur-
rent literature lacks systematic, conclusive studies regarding this
important clinical observation.
It is worth noting that Kallmann Syndrome, a genetic disor-
der in which the olfactory bulb and its tracts develop abnormally,
is often characterized by complete anosmia or hyposmia (Madan
et al., 2004; Fechner et al., 2008). Similarly, bifrontal craniotomies,
a surgical procedure that removes the olfactory bulbs or olfactory
nerves, have been performed on patients with severe phantosmias
(e.g., olfactory hallucinations) and have yielded bilateral perma-
nent anosmia (Markert et al., 1993). Excision of the olfactory
epithelium has also been used as a treatment for severe phan-
tosmias. In some cases, the procedure is not only effective in
eliminating the phantosmias, but the patient has his/her olfac-
tory ability restored after some time (Leopold, 2002). Based on
these ﬁndings, one can conclude that, though there is some
evidence that olfactory consciousness of some kind can persist
despite the absence of the olfactory epithelium and olfactory bulb,
more data are required before drawing strong conclusions regard-
ing the necessary role of these peripheral structures in olfactory
consciousness.
Second, we discuss the role of the thalamus. Although in olfac-
tion the thalamus is not immediately inﬂuenced by the bottom-up
afference (as is the case in other modalities), the MDNT does
receive inputs from cortical regions that are involved in olfactory
processing (Haberly, 1998). Hence, one should refrain from con-
cluding that, in olfactory consciousness, thalamic processing is
unnecessary. Nevertheless, because olfactory afferents bypass the
relay thalamus, one can draw a more conservative conclusion:
Consciousness of some sort does not require the ﬁrst-order tha-
lamic nuclei, at least for olfactory experiences and under several
assumptions (Morsella et al., 2010).
It is likely that the MDNT plays a signiﬁcant role in high-
level olfactory processes, those above the processing of the early
afferent signal. For example, as mentioned above, evidence sug-
gests that this structure is important in olfactory discrimination
(Eichenbaum et al., 1980; Slotnick and Risser, 1990; Tham et al.,
2011), olfactory identiﬁcation, and olfactory hedonics (Sela et al.,
2009). The MDNT is also signiﬁcant in more general cognitive
processes, including attentional mechanisms (Tham et al., 2009,
2011), learning (Mitchell et al., 2007), and memory (Markowitsch,
1982). It is important to note that, pertinent to the topic at hand,
no study we are aware of has documented a lack of basic con-
scious olfactory experience resulting from lesions of the MDNT
(but see theorizing in Plailly et al., 2008). It seems that olfac-
tory discrimination of some sort can survive following lesions
of the MDNT (Slotnick and Kaneko, 1981; Slotnick and Risser,
1990).
In addition, it is important to consider that, regarding second-
order thalamic relays such as the MDNT, these nuclei are similar
in nature to ﬁrst-order relays in terms of their circuitry (Sherman
and Guillery, 2006). Thus, the circuitry of the MDNT is quite sim-
plistic compared to, say, that of a cortical column. In addition, as
mentioned above, the thalamus in olfactory processing involves
only sparse ﬁber density. One might propose that such simplis-
tic circuitry would be insufﬁcient to instantiate a phenomenon as
sophisticated as consciousness, but such a conclusion would be
premature. To date, there is no strong theorizing regarding the
kind of circuitry that the instantiation of consciousness would
entail. Moreover, very little is known about all aspects of thala-
mic processing (see Morecraft et al., 1992). Hence, at this stage
of understanding, one cannot rule out that thalamic processes
are capable of constituting consciousness (see strong evidence for
involvement of the thalamus in consciousness in Merker, 2007;
Ward, 2011).
Regarding the paleocortex, it has been proposed that corti-
cal involvement is required for consciousness of any kind (see
various accounts in Godwin et al., 2013). Thus, lesions of the
cortical regions involved in olfactory processing should result
in the inability to have conscious olfactory experiences. Accord-
ing to Barr and Kiernan (1993), olfactory consciousness depends
primarily on the piriform cortex. It is interesting to note that,
if conscious olfactory experience can arise at the level of the
piriform cortex, then this would be the only case in which a
sensory system achieves conscious perception with little or no
involvement of neocortical or thalamocortical circuits. How-
ever, according to Sela and Sobel (2010), and based on our
own review of the literature, there are no documented cases of
anosmia that have arisen due to focal lesions of the piriform cor-
tex. Accordingly, in the animal literature, Staubli et al. (1987)
showed that rats with ablations to the piriform cortex were still
able to discriminate between simple odor cues (although not
complex odor cues) in a comparable manner to control rats,
suggesting that the piriform cortex may aid in more complex
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odor discrimination tasks but is unnecessary for the discrimina-
tion between simple odors. (Of course, one must be conservative
when drawing conclusions about the conscious experience of these
animals.)
Complementing these observations, the piriform cortex
exhibits increases in odorant-induced activity at the onset of a
new odor (Sobel et al., 2000; Poellinger et al., 2001). Although the
time-course of this activation (from fMRI studies) varies from
study to study [from 10 to 15 s (Poellinger et al., 2001) and 30
to 40 s (Sobel et al., 2000)], both the studies by Poellinger et al.
(2001) and Sobel et al. (2000) indicate that accurate odor detec-
tion persists after activation in the piriform decreases to a baseline
(or below baseline) level. Conversely, activation in the OFC does
not decrease over odorant exposure (60 s; Poellinger et al., 2001).
This difference in activation levels may represent the functional
importance of olfactory tracts that bypass the piriform cortex and
project directly from the bulb to the OFC (Shipley and Adamek,
1984).
Regarding the role of neocortex, Keller (2011) concludes,
“There are reasons to assume that the phenomenal neural correlate
of olfactory consciousness is found in the neocortical OFC” (p. 6;
see additional evidence in Mizobuchi et al., 1999). In line with
this proposal, Cicerone and Tanenbaum (1997) observed com-
plete anosmia in a patient with a lesion to the left orbital gyrus of
the frontal lobe, and Li et al. (2010) reported a comprehensive case
study of a patient who experienced complete anosmia as a result of
a rightOFC lesion. Despite the patient’s complete lack of conscious
olfactory experience, neural activity and autonomic responses
revealed a robust sense of blind-smell (unconscious olfactory pro-
cessing that inﬂuences behavior; Sobel et al., 1999), a phenomenon
we discuss below. This evidence suggests that, while many aspects
of olfaction can occur unconsciously, the OFC is necessary for
conscious olfactory experience. Independent of this research, and
consistent with cortical accounts of consciousness, it has been pro-
posed that the conscious aspects of odor discrimination depend
primarily on the activities of the frontal and orbitofrontal cortices
(Buck, 2000).
However, not all accounts implicate the neocortex in the gener-
ation of olfactory consciousness (e.g., Barr andKiernan, 1993) and
not all documented lesions of the OFC have resulted in anosmia.
For instance, Zatorre and Jones-Gotman (1991) documented cases
in which OFC lesions resulted in severe deﬁcits, yet all patients
demonstrated normal olfactory detection thresholds. Zatorre and
Jones-Gotman (1991) conclude that the OFC is important in
odor discrimination but not in conscious odor detection. More-
over, in the animal literature, rats with lesions of the OFC still
perform normally on odor-identiﬁcation tasks (Tait and Brown,
2007). Of course, only limited conclusions can be drawn because
of the neuroanatomical differences in the OFC between the rat
and humans (Uylings et al., 2003) and because of the difﬁculty
of determining whether the animal is consciously experiencing a
smell (e.g., the behavior of the animal could reﬂect a sort of blind
smell).
In conclusion, although it is clear that the olfactory system is
well suited system for the isolation of a neural correlate of con-
sciousness, the current literature does not permit one to draw
strong conclusions regarding the neuroanatomical regions that
are critical for the generation of olfactory consciousness. Inves-
tigations on the neural correlates of phantosmias may further
illuminate the circuits required for olfactory consciousness. But
this is challenging research: It has proven difﬁcult to identify the
minimal region(s) whose stimulation is sufﬁcient to induce olfac-
tory hallucinations (Mizobuchi et al., 1999). It appears that, once
more data are available, conclusions with greater certainty may
soon be drawn, especially concerning the roles of the peripheral
structures (the olfactory epithelium and bulb) and the MDNT in
the generation of olfactory consciousness.
PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE/MECHANISTIC
PROPERTIES
There are phenomenological and cognitive/mechanistic proper-
ties that render the olfactory system a fruitful network in which to
investigate the contrast between conscious and unconscious pro-
cessing. Regarding the phenomenological properties, unlike what
occurs with other sensory modalities, olfaction regularly yields
no subjective experience of any kind when the system is under-
stimulated, as when odorants are in very low concentrations or
during sensory habituation to odorants. This “experiential noth-
ingness”(Morsella et al., 2010) ismore akin to the phenomenology
of the blind spot than to what one experiences when visual stimu-
lation is absent (darkness). It is important to note that, in the latter
case, there still exists a conscious, visual experience (e.g., that of
a black ﬁeld). The experiential nothingness produced by an olfac-
tory system yields no conscious contents of any kind to such an
extent that, absent memory, one would not be able to know that
one possessed an olfactory system. (For a comparison of olfactory
consciousness to the phenomenon of change blindness in vision,
see Sela and Sobel, 2010.)
As noted, this form of experiential nothingness can result from
habituation or from an inadequate level of olfactory stimulation.
In the latter case, subjects may be consciously unaware of the
presence of an odorant (e.g., lavender) but still be inﬂuenced by
the odorant unconsciously, as in the phenomenon of blind-smell
(Sobel et al., 1999), the olfactory analog of blindsight (Weiskrantz,
1992), in which patients report to be blind but still exhibit visu-
ally guided behaviors. For example, in blindsight, a patient may
self-report to be unable to see anything but may nonetheless walk
around an obstacle placed in her path. In blind-smell, people can
learn to associate certain odorants (e.g., lavender) with certain
environments (e.g., a particular room), even though the concen-
tration of odorants presented during learning was consciously
imperceptible (Degel et al., 2001). That the subliminal odorant
is inﬂuencing behavior is detectable in behavior and decision-
making. The ﬁndings from research on blind-smell complement
similar ﬁndings from investigations on subliminal visual percep-
tion (Pessiglione et al., 2007; see review in Hallett, 2007). Thus,
the olfactory system features properties that render it ideal for
experiments designed to contrast the neural correlates of sensory
processes that are conscious (e.g., the smell of fresh bread) with
those that lie in an experiential nothingness, as in the blind-smell
of subliminal odorants.
Regarding habituation, though this phenomenon occurs in all
sensory modalities, it may occur in a special manner for olfaction
because of the absence of the possibility of voluntary re-access
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to an exposed odorant (Stevenson, 2009). For example, in hap-
tic sensation, one may habituate to the feeling of wearing a wrist
watch. Similar habituation can occur in olfaction: Upon entering
a room, one may detect a smell for some time, before one habit-
uates, and then the smell vanishes from consciousness. Although
both sensory stimuli fade from consciousness, the feeling of one’s
watch can be experienced anew by voluntarily directing attention
toward the watch. However, it seems that olfactory sensations
cannot be re-accessed as easily through these attentional means
(Köster, 2002). Regarding the experiential nothingness associated
with olfaction, it is important to reiterate that research indicates
that (a) accurate odor detection persists after activation in the
piriform decreases to a baseline (or below baseline) level (Sobel
et al., 2000; Poellinger et al., 2001), and (b) activation in the OFC
does not decrease over odorant exposure (60 s; Poellinger et al.,
2001).
We discussed three states associated with olfactory conscious-
ness: (A) subliminal perception (Figure 1), which includes
no conscious contents, (B) conscious detection of an odorant
(Figure 2), which includes conscious contents and is indexed
by self-report on the part of the subject, and (C) habituation
(Figure 3), which, like subliminal perception, includes no con-
scious contents. When isolating the neural correlate of olfactory
consciousness (NCC-O), one should seek regions that are active
during B but not during A and C. It is important to note that
the NCC-O of an odorant, as indexed by self-report, should not
vary as a function of the organism’s motivational or incentive
state.
Consider the example in which a master chef must detect
whether the soups served in her restaurant are being cooked prop-
erly. The chef must compare the smell dimension of the dish
to some standard in memory (e.g., perfect carrot soup). This
conscious perception occurs in an invariable manner regardless
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the relationship between the
subjective events associated with subliminal perception of olfactory
stimuli and hypothetical neural activity.
FIGURE 2 | Schematic representation of the relationship between the
subjective events associated with conscious detection of olfactory
stimuli and hypothetical neural activity.
FIGURE 3 | Schematic representation of the relationship between
hypothetical neural activity and the subjective events associated with
habituation of olfactory stimuli.
of the chef ’s current emotional/incentive state. This is obvious
when one observes in the chef a series of invariable judgments
made when evaluating soups at different times. It would not be
adaptive for the smell of token odorants (e.g., a soup) to be identi-
ﬁed differently at different times, because of variables concerning
the internal state of the organism. Of course, if the chef is hungry
or sated, her entire conscious experience will be different when
smelling the food item, but these motivational/incentive variables
reﬂect other dimensions of conscious experience. Simply put, the
smell of a banana, if experienced consciously by the organism,
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must be experienced in the same way when the organism is, say,
hungry or sated. It is adaptive for there to be such an invariance and
an independence between motivation and perception, as noted by
Rolls et al. (1977) in their discussion of the limits of motivational
inﬂuences over visual perception: “It would not be adaptive, for
example, to become blind to the sight of food after we have eaten
it to satiety” (p. 144). This is because food items are not used just
for eating; they can also be used as, say, projectiles to throw at an
entertainer.
Hence, the perception of the items should be invariant and
not vary by emotional/incentive state. Our chef example reminds
one of the multidimensional nature of conscious experiences
and is reminiscent of the classic research regarding the multiple
conscious dimensions of subjective pain (e.g., the sensorial and
affective dimensions; Melzack and Casey, 1968). To give another
example, no one who “grew to like olives,” who at ﬁrst did not like
olives, ever thought that the ﬁrst olive they ever tasted failed to
represent subsequent olives, at least in terms of the ﬂavor. When
growing to like olives, something does change in one’s conscious
experience, but it is not the conscious perception of the olive
ﬂavor. This has implications for the study of the NCC-O: The
NCC-O for a given odorant should vary as a function of whether
there is (A) subliminal perception, (B) conscious detection of an
odorant, or (C) habituation. However, it should not vary as a
function of the organism being sated or hungry (Figure 4). It
should be clariﬁed, however, that it remains an empirical question
whether the NCC-O of an odorant remains unchanging regard-
less of, say, the organism’s current incentive/motivation state or
the positive/negative contingencies associated with that odorant.
There is evidence suggesting that the neural pattern underlying
the representation of an odorant is changed slightly if that odor-
ant is reinforced or unreinforced through conditioning (Freeman,
2007b; see also Keller, 2011).
FIGURE 4 | Schematic representation of the relationship between
subjective olfactory experience and hypothetical neural activity, under
conditions of hunger and satiation.
Concerning habituation, its effects can be seen at the receptor
level aswell as at the level of the olfactory bulb (Wilson,2009). Data
concerning the functioning of the piriform cortex andOFCduring
habituation are less straightforward (Sobel et al., 2000; Poellinger
et al., 2001; Wilson, 2009).
The olfactory system is a fruitful network in which to isolate the
NCC-O also because of its cognitive/mechanistic properties. First,
unlike in the visual modality, there are few sophisticated cognitive
control functions that are usually coupled with olfactory process-
ing. For example, there is no phenomenon in olfaction that is
analogous to mental rotation, a form of high-level symbol manip-
ulation. Thus, in olfaction, one is less likely to conﬂate the NCC-O
with the neural correlates of high-level executive functions (see
Aru et al., 2012), which is a recurring problem in the search for
the visual NCC (see discussion in Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2013).
In addition, because of the relative lack of control functions in
olfaction, the subjective experience of the self-reporting subject
is unlikely to be contaminated by introspections regarding, not
olfactory experience, but cognitive effort or other aspects of con-
trol. In a similar vein, in vision and audition,mental images can be
used to preserve information in working memory through active
executive processes such as rehearsal (Baddeley, 2007), but olfac-
tory images are difﬁcult to couple with such executive operations
(Stevenson, 2009). In fact, it has been demonstrated that partic-
ipants report that olfactory images are more difﬁcult to produce
and less vivid in comparison to other forms of mental imagery
(Betts, 1909; Brower, 1947; Lawless, 1997; Stevenson, 2009).
Second, olfactory experiences are less likely to occur in a self-
generated, stochastic manner. Unlike in the case of vision and
audition, in which visually rich daydreaming or “ear worms”
(i.e., a song involuntarily repeating in one’s head) can occur
spontaneously during an experiment and contaminate visual and
auditory dependent measures, respectively, there are little, if any,
such self-generated olfactory experiences that could contaminate
psychophysical measures. Last, the olfactory system is more segre-
gated from the semantic system than is the most studied sensory
system – vision. Many have argued that, in the case of vision, there
are deep, inextricable relationships among perception, conceptu-
alization, and semantic processing (Barsalou, 1999; Kosslyn et al.,
2006). Such is not the case for olfaction. Thus, when isolating the
NCC-O, one is less likely to include in it higher-level processes
(e.g., semantic processes) that are associated with more than just
simple olfactory (conscious) detection.
NEURODYNAMICS
For present purposes, it is fortunate that the olfactory system was
one of the ﬁrst systems inwhich the nature of oscillatory activity in
the brain was investigated (e.g., Adrian, 1942). Before discussing
research on the nature of this oscillatory activity, we will dis-
cuss the more general relationship between brain rhythms and
consciousness.
It has been proposed that, to instantiate consciousness of any
kind, the mode of interaction among regions is as important as
the nature and loci of the regions activated (Ward, 2003; Buzsáki,
2006; Godwin et al., 2013). For example, the presence or lack of
interregional synchrony leads to different behavioral, cognitive, and
even consciously experienced outcomes (Ward, 2003; Hummel
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andGerloff, 2005; Lewis et al., 2012). [See review of neuronal com-
munication through “coherence” in Fries (2005)]. Regarding the
neurodynamics underlying consciousness, the general view is that
consciousness depends on “precise synchronization of oscillatory
neuronal responses in the high frequency range (beta, gamma)”
(Singer, 2011, p. 43). Singer (2011) adds, “brain states compati-
ble with conscious processing should be characterized by a high
degree of synchrony” (p. 43). Similar conclusions about the role
of high frequencies in consciousness are found in the literature
(e.g., Crick and Koch, 1990; Engel and Singer, 2001; Meador
et al., 2002; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Doesburg et al., 2005;
Aru and Bachmann, 2009; Doesburg et al., 2009; Uhlhaas et al.,
2009; Hameroff, 2010; Wessel et al., 2012). Most recently, with the
use of more sensitive technologies, the hypothesis was supported
by Panagiotaropoulos et al. (2012), who examined activities of the
lateral prefrontal cortex of the macaque. As revealed below, the
olfactory system has the potential to provide additional evidence
for these conclusions, such as those concerning the roles of gamma
and beta frequencies in cognition. In addition, the relative simplic-
ity of the neuroanatomical architecture of the system renders it a
fruitful environment in which to investigate the neurodynamics
of consciousness. (For a general review of the role of oscillations
in cognition, see Sauseng and Klimesch, 2008; Wang, 2010; Siegel
et al., 2012.)
Generally, the empirical evidence suggests that olfactory infor-
mation may be encoded through oscillating neural assemblies
(Adrian, 1942, 1950a,b; Freeman, 1975; Eeckman and Freeman,
1990; Gray, 1994; Laurent and Davidowitz, 1994; Kim et al.,
2006). Different odorants elicit different, complex spatial patterns
across spatially distributed neural ensembles of the olfactory bulb
(Freeman, 1987; Laurent and Davidowitz, 1994; Xu et al., 2000).
The elements comprising these dynamic patterns of activation are
not static, but can evolve dynamically over time (Freeman, 1987;
Laurent, 1996).
Classic research on the olfactory bulb, for example, illu-
minates the occurrence of organized, high frequency activity
(gamma in the rat, ranging from 40 to 100 Hz; Adrian, 1942,
1950a,b; Kay and Beshel, 2010) during the perception of odorants.
These high-frequency gamma “bursts” appear to be coordinated
with respiration, which is associated with a slower oscillatory
cycle (theta in the rat: 2–12 Hz; Eeckman and Freeman, 1990;
Rojas-Líbano and Kay, 2008; Kay et al., 2009). [Concerning theta,
Kay et al. (2009) state, “In the olfactory system, theta oscillations
track the respiratory cycle and range in waking rodents from 2
to 12 Hz, with frequencies above 4 Hz deﬁned usually as sniff-
ing” (p. 9). See Schroeder and Lakatos (2009) for a treatment
of the role of the respiratory cycle in oscillations.] Speciﬁcally,
each phasic gamma burst begins shortly after inspiration, termi-
nates during expiration, and can be modulated (via increases in
frequency and duration) by the presence of an odorant (Eeck-
man and Freeman, 1990). Adrian (1942) associated the gamma
burst with increased inter-cellular activity (including excitation
and inhibition between neurons) within the olfactory bulb, a
view that has been corroborated by subsequent research (Rall
and Shepherd, 1968; Mori and Takagi, 1978; Gray, 1994; Lagier
et al., 2004; Kay et al., 2009). [See Buzsáki and Wang (2012) for
discussion of the origins of gamma oscillations.] If the lateral
olfactory tract–axons of a subset of cells from the bulb that
project to the piriform cortex (Haberly, 1998)–is severed or other-
wise disrupted, gamma oscillations in the bulb persist (Gray and
Skinner, 1988), but gamma no longer occurs in piriform cortex
(Freeman, 1979; Haberly, 1998). This suggests that the mecha-
nism involved in producing gamma oscillations resides within the
olfactory bulb. (For a treatment of the interactions between the
olfactory bulb and cortex, see Boyd et al., 2012; Oswald and Urban,
2012. For research on the role of gamma as a “temporal ﬁlter,” see
Litaudon et al., 2008.)
Further support for the aforementioned hypothesis that the
olfactory bulb is the functional equivalent of the thalamus is
provided by the study of oscillations in the olfactory system.
Experiments have revealed that correlations between slow-wave
(theta) activity in the olfactory bulb and piriform cortex resem-
ble those found between the thalamus and neocortex (Fontanini
et al., 2003; Fontanini and Bower, 2006). Importantly, local ﬁeld
potentials and intracellular membrane potentials in the piriform
cortex are strongly correlated with the slow-wave oscillatory pat-
tern of the olfactory bulb (Fontanini and Bower, 2006). A similar
inter-relationship occurs between the thalamus and neocortex
(Contreras and Steriade, 1995).
The functional role that gamma oscillations may play in olfac-
tion and in sensory perception is still under debate, as is the nature
of processing in the olfactory bulb (Gervais et al., 2007). Research
suggests that the higher the task demand (e.g., ﬁne discrimination
of odors versus simple discrimination of odors), the higher the
gamma amplitude will be in early perceptual processing (Beshel
et al., 2007). For example, in the olfactory bulb of the rat, whenﬁne
odorant discriminations are required in a two-alternative choice
task, there are high gamma amplitudes, independent of changes in
the frequency bands of theta and beta (Beshel et al., 2007). Accord-
ingly, disturbing gamma oscillations in invertebrates impairs the
discrimination of similar odors (a high task demand), but does not
impair the discrimination of dissimilar odors (a low task demand;
Stopfer et al., 1997).
Gamma oscillations have been studied in the mammalian
olfactory system since the time of Adrian. More recently, beta
oscillations (∼15–30 Hz in the rat; Kay et al., 2009; Kay and
Beshel,2010) have attracted attention. These oscillations have been
observed in response to volatile odorants and organic solvents, and
are found in the olfactory bulb, piriform cortex, entorhinal cortex,
and hippocampus (Zibrowski and Vanderwolf, 1997; Vanderwolf
and Zibrowski, 2001). Unlike gamma oscillations, oscillations in
the beta range require participation of (at least) the piriform cor-
tex (Neville andHaberly, 2003). Surgical interruption of the lateral
olfactory tract eliminates beta oscillations in the olfactory bulb
(Neville andHaberly, 2003), whereas, asmentioned above, gamma
oscillations can persist following such an interruption (Gray and
Skinner, 1988).
It has been hypothesized that the reciprocal interactions
between the bulb and piriform cortex engender local ﬁeld poten-
tial oscillations in the beta range (Neville and Haberly, 2003).
Beta oscillation episodes last longer than those of gamma oscil-
lations, usually spanning 2–4 inhalation cycles in the rat. These
oscillations are speciﬁc to a given odorant and reset when a new
odorant is presented (Lowry and Kay, 2007). Beta oscillations in
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the olfactory bulb and anterior piriform cortex of the rat typi-
cally develop over the ﬁrst three or four exposures to a particular
odorant. In the piriform cortex of the rat, beta oscillations have
also been shown to have a gradual enhancement or sensitization
over repeated presentations of odorants, which, for certain odors,
can last up to several days (e.g., Vanderwolf and Zibrowski, 2001).
Beta coherence between the olfactory bulb and the hippocam-
pus also accompanies odor learning in a go/no-go task (Martin
et al., 2007). These oscillations have also been associated with cer-
tain types of odor learning (Martin et al., 2004; Kay et al., 2009)
and odor discrimination. A study conducted by Kay and Beshel
(2010) examined the phase of beta in the olfactory bulb and the
anterior and posterior piriform cortices of the rat as the ani-
mal performed a two-alternative odor discrimination choice task.
These investigators found that beta oscillations in the olfactory
bulb drove or “entrained” both areas of the piriform, suggesting
that beta oscillations may serve the purpose of transmitting olfac-
tory information from the olfactory bulb to higher order, more
cognitive areas. Accordingly, sensory research outside of olfac-
tion has found evidence that beta may be involved in sensory
gating (Hong et al., 2008) or in large-scale coupling for sensorimo-
tor integration (Freeman, 2007b; Siegel et al., 2012). In addition,
Kay et al. (2009) propose that, “beta oscillations are associated
with motor models, favoring this oscillation as a good substrate
for long-distance communication” (p. 7). Together, these stud-
ies suggest that beta oscillations may serve as a mechanism to
link the olfactory system to various subcortical and cortical areas
for cognitive processing (e.g., short-term perceptual learning and
memory formation). Consistent with this interpretation, it has
been proposed that, though gamma frequencies can be observed
in processing at primary sensory areas, when the sensory informa-
tion becomes part of a wider network which includes activations
from other sensory modalities, then the frequencies are in the
beta range (Freeman, 2007b). This occurs in olfaction (Freeman,
2007b). It remains unclear whether the higher frequency oscilla-
tions (e.g., those in the gamma range) play an essential role in the
instantiation of conscious content (e.g., olfactory content X) or
whether such a content can be instantiated independently by the
more global (and slower) frequency ranges (e.g., beta). The neu-
roanatomical evidence reviewed above suggests that the central
processes can instantiate the conscious representations of senso-
rial content without the peripheral structures. These facts remain
puzzling.
Researchers have also examined the possible relationships
among the different frequency bands (including cross-frequency
phase synchronization; Sauseng and Klimesch, 2008) in the olfac-
tory system. For example, Ravel et al. (2003) examined the
relationship between gamma and beta oscillations by recording
local ﬁeld potentials in the olfactory bulb while rats performed
an olfactory discrimination task. During this task, there was
decreased power in the gamma band and increased power in
the beta band (Ravel et al., 2003). The same pattern of activa-
tion was even more notable in well-trained rats, with gamma now
being signiﬁcantly decreased in both duration and amplitude, and
beta power being ampliﬁed twofold during odor sampling (Ravel
et al., 2003). As concluded by Kay and Beshel (2010), “Beta and
gamma oscillations are not simply different frequencies but also
show some opposing effects in the olfactory network” (p. 836).
In addition, theta coherence (reﬂecting the strength of interac-
tion between the olfactory bulb and piriform cortex) has been
shown to increase parametrically to odorant volatility in awake
rats but not in urethane-anesthetized rats (Lowry and Kay, 2007).
Theta band coherence may facilitate beta oscillations, which, as
mentioned above,may be a key mechanism for transmitting infor-
mation across the olfactory system (Lowry and Kay, 2007; Kay and
Beshel, 2010).
This brief survey into the neurodynamics of olfaction reveals
that the relative simplicity of the neuroanatomical architecture
of the olfactory system renders it a fruitful network in which to
study brain oscillations (Freeman, 2007a; Schroeder and Lakatos,
2009). Examination of the long-studied oscillatory properties of
the olfactory system corroborates what has been observed in other
sensory modalities (cf., Fries, 2005; Sauseng and Klimesch, 2008;
Singer, 2011; Siegel et al., 2012): (a) the synchronizations of high
frequencies (e.g., gamma) in local (e.g., olfactory bulb) afferent
processing (von Stein and Sarnthein, 2000; Bruns and Eckhorn,
2004; Kay and Beshel, 2010), especially when the process is chal-
lenging (e.g., ﬁne discrimination versus simple discrimination;
Kay and Beshel, 2010), and (b) the synchronization at a somewhat
slower frequency range (e.g., beta or theta) for integration with
a larger-scale cognitive network (Kay et al., 2009; Kay and Beshel,
2010), the next topic of discussion.
LARGE-SCALE NETWORK PROPERTIES
While it has been proposed that each of the sensory modules (e.g.,
for the perception of color, motion, and depth) can generate
some form of conscious contents on its own (a “microcon-
sciousness”; Zeki and Bartels, 1999), others have argued that, to
become conscious, a content must become part of a broader,
supra-modal network. More speciﬁcally, it has been proposed
that, for olfactory perceptual information (“olfactory content,”
for short) to become a conscious content, it must interact with
other, traditionally non-olfactory regions of the brain (Cooney
and Gazzaniga, 2003). For example, olfactory contents may be
transformed into conscious contents once they inﬂuence processes
that are semantic-linguistic (Herz, 2003) or motor (Mainland and
Sobel, 2006). These views are consistent with a consensus regard-
ing the function of conscious processing more generally – that
conscious processes integrate neural activities and information-
processing structures that would otherwise be independent (Baars,
1988, 1998, 2005, 2013; Tononi and Edelman, 1988; Damasio,
1989; Freeman, 1991; Srinivasan et al., 1999; Zeki and Bartels,
1999; Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Llinás and Ribary, 2001; Varela et al., 2001; Clark, 2002; Ortin-
ski and Meador, 2004; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Morsella,
2005; Del Cul et al., 2007; Kriegel, 2007; Merker, 2007; Does-
burg et al., 2009; Uhlhaas et al., 2009; Boly et al., 2011; Koch,
2012; Tallon-Baudry, 2012; Tononi, 2012). (See reviews of the
integration consensus in Baars, 2002, 2013, and in Morsella,
2005.) Consistent with the integration consensus, Uhlhaas et al.
(2009) specify that the earliest signature of conscious processing
is, “the precise phase locking across a widely distributed cortical
network” (p. 11). According to Freeman (2004), the conscious
representations of information from different sources, such as
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from the different sensorymodalities,must at some level be similar
in form in order for the information from each of these modal-
ities to be integrated with that of the other modalities, thereby
forming a polysensory Gestalt of the world. In addition, the form
must permit interaction between perceptual and motor systems
(Freeman, 2004) if there is to be perception-to-action transla-
tions. It has been proposed that these perceptual Gestalts arise
in consciousness in a discontinuous manner, with each conscious
moment reﬂecting one snapshot of ongoing integration, resem-
bling the still images of a motion picture, which, when presented
one after the other, produce the illusion of continuous motion
(Freeman, 2004, 2007b; Koch, 2004). (To learn about the level of
representation that characterizes conscious contents, see Freeman,
2007a.)
Moreover, in both perception-based research and action-based
research, conscious processing has been associatedwithmore inte-
gration than unconscious processing, in terms of the information
integration involved and in terms of the neural processes involved.
For example, in action-based research, it has been documented
that actions de-coupled from conscious processing [e.g., in blind-
sight, anarchic hand syndrome (Marchetti and Della Sala, 1998),
automatisms, and other neurological disorders] reﬂect less inte-
gration than their conscious counterparts, as if the actions are not
inﬂuenced by the kinds of information by which they should be
inﬂuenced. Hence, the actions appear thoughtless, impulsive, and
irrational.
One limitation of the integration consensus is that integra-
tion is a ubiquitous function in the nervous system, occurring
for both conscious and unconscious processes. It seems that
many kinds of information integration can occur unconsciously
in the nervous system ﬁeld. For example, in afference binding
(Morsella and Bargh, 2011), integration occurs within sensory
modalities (e.g., the binding of color to shape; Zeki and Bartels,
1999) and between sensory modalities, as in the case of the ven-
triloquist illusion (cf., McDonald and Ward, 2000; Watanabe and
Shimojo, 2001) and in the McGurk effect (McGurk and Mac-
Donald, 1976). (See list of unconsciously mediated intersensory
illusions in Morsella, 2005, Table 1.) Unconscious integration of
various kinds also occurs during motor control (the activation
of muscle ﬁbers through motor programs; James, 1890; Gross-
berg, 1999; Fecteau et al., 2001; Rossetti, 2001; Rosenbaum, 2002;
Goodale and Milner, 2004; Johnson and Haggard, 2005; Heath
et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2008), and during the control of smooth
muscle (e.g., peristalsis and the pupillary reﬂex; Morsella et al.,
2009b). Unconscious integrations also occur in the perception of
the ﬂavor of food, which involves the combining of information
from multiple modalities (including haptic, gustatory, and olfac-
tory; Shepherd, 2006), and in pain perception, in which there is,
for example, interaction between sensory (lateral pain system) and
affective components (medial pain system; Melzack and Casey,
1968; Nagasako et al., 2003).
Unconscious integration also occurs in efference binding
(Haggard et al., 2002), which links perceptual processing to
action/motor processing. Through this kind of stimulus-response
binding, one can learn to press a button when presented with
a stimulus cue in a laboratory paradigm. It has been demon-
strated that, in a choice response time task, participants can select
the correct motor response (one of two button presses) when
confronted with subliminal stimuli (see review in Hallett, 2007).
Such unconscious efference binding also takes place in the case of
reﬂexive responses to the natural environment, as in the pain with-
drawal reﬂex. [Regarding neuroanatomy, in animals such as the
dog, sophisticated and intentional forms of sophisticated behav-
ior remainwhenmuch of the cortex is removed through surgery or
deactivated (e.g., chemically inactivated; Bures et al., 1974), leav-
ing intact only the ventral forebrain, including the paleocortex
(the oldest part of the forebrain), the amygdala, and the neurohu-
moral brain stem stimuli (Goltz, 1892; Bures et al., 1974; Panksepp,
1998). See extensive treatments in Freeman (2004) and in Merker
(2007).]
In summary, the actions resulting from such unconscious bind-
ings can seem not adaptive, as if they are not inﬂuenced by
the kinds of information by which they should be inﬂuenced.
Hence, these actions have been described as un-integrated actions
(Morsella and Bargh, 2011).
As discussed in Morsella (2005), in contrast to these forms
of unconscious integration, there are forms of integration that
always appear to involve conscious mediation. Such is the case
for integrated actions (Morsella and Bargh, 2011), in which two
(or more) action plans that could normally inﬂuence behavior on
their own (when existing at that level of activation) are simul-
taneously co-activated and trying to inﬂuence the same skeletal
muscle effector (Morsella and Bargh, 2011). Thus, integrated
action occurs when one suppresses the urge to scratch an itch,
holds one’s breath, refrains from dropping a hot dish, sup-
presses a pre-potent response in a laboratory paradigm, or makes
oneself breathe faster (Morsella, 2005; Morsella et al., 2009a). Inte-
grated action involves the activation of more neural processes
than does un-integrated action (DeSoto et al., 2001; Ortinski
and Meador, 2004). Based on these observations, it has been
proposed that consciousness is required, not for just any form
of integration, but for integrations involving the skeletal mus-
cle effector system. Speciﬁcally, it has been proposed that it
is required for integrating two conﬂicting streams of efference
binding (see quantitative review of evidence in Morsella et al.,
2011). Such efference–efference binding results in integrated actions
such as holding one’s breath. Through consciousness, multiple
response systems can inﬂuence behavior collectively (Morsella,
2005). Absent consciousness, only one stream can inﬂuence action
control. This approach is unique in its ability to explain sub-
jective data from (a) intersensory conﬂicts, which are largely
unconscious, (b) smooth muscle conﬂicts, which, too, are largely
unconscious, and (c) conﬂicts from action conﬂicts (e.g., holding
one’s breath and Stroop-like interference), which tend to involve
consciousness.
CONSCIOUSNESS IS FOR VOLUNTARY ACTION
Delineating the intimate liaison between consciousness and skele-
tal muscle is outside the purview of the present treatise (see
discussion in Morsella, 2005). For present purposes, it is impor-
tant to note that this theorizing leads one to the conclusion that
the integration achieved through conscious processing is inti-
mately related – not to perceptual processing, semantic processing,
smooth muscle control, or motor control – but to voluntary
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action. Simply put, consciousness is for voluntary action. In light
of this, one realizes that it is no accident that, historically, skele-
tal muscle has been the only effector referred to as “voluntary”
muscle. The appellation stems from the fact that this effector sys-
tem is controlled through conscious mediation and that, without
such mediation, adaptive integration fails to occur in this sys-
tem, as in the case of un-integrated actions, such as reﬂexively
dropping a hot (but expensive) dish of china or failing to hold
one’s breath underwater. These are the kinds of un-integrated
actions that transpirewhen consciousness abates. (Consistentwith
this approach, it has been proposed that consciousness serves to
prevent premature action that does not take into account impor-
tant, alternative courses of possible action, as when one avoids
temptation, holds off fear and anger, or takes time to reﬂect
on the long-term consequences of an action; Freeman, 2004.)
Speciﬁcally, skeletal muscle is “voluntary” muscle because it is
directed by multiple, encapsulated systems that, when in con-
ﬂict, require consciousness to yield adaptive, integrated action
(Morsella, 2005). For this reason, for every voluntary action emit-
ted by the organism, the organism can self-report a conscious
content that was responsible for that action (Poehlman et al.,
2012), regardless of whether such an introspection is accurate
or based on an illusion (Wegner, 2003). (See Freeman, 2004,
for a treatment of how the notion of “circular causality” can
inform theories about the functionof consciousness in thenervous
system.)
From this theoretical standpoint, one can hypothesize that,
in olfaction, perceptual information may become conscious only
once it participates in a large-scale, inter-system integration that
is in the service of voluntary action, which is, stated more pre-
cisely, adaptive and integrated skeletal muscle output (see related
evidence in Mainland and Sobel, 2006). By extension, one could
propose (a) that, for every voluntary action based on olfactory
contents, the organism can self-report about a conscious olfac-
tory content, and (b) that, if an olfactory content is unconscious,
then neither voluntary action nor integrated action can result
intentionally from that content.
THE “LOWEST HANGING FRUIT” IN THE STUDY OF THE NEURAL
CORRELATES OF OLFACTORY CONSCIOUSNESS
We now conclude by reviewing what, in our review, appear to be
the“lowest hanging fruit”regarding the isolation of the neural cor-
relates of olfactory consciousness. First, regarding neuroanatomy,
by synthesizing the data from various sources (including lesion
studies, animal experiments, and phenomena such as blind smell
and sensory habituation), investigators can determine whether
peripheral structures (e.g., the olfactory epithelium and olfactory
bulb) and thalamic structures (e.g.,MDNT) are necessary for there
to be a conscious olfactory experience of any kind, including an
olfactory hallucination triggered by direct brain stimulation (e.g.,
in the OFC). At this stage of understanding, it seems that mak-
ing such a determination would be more difﬁcult in the case of the
piriform cortex. It is important to reiterate that, if conscious olfac-
tory experience can arise at the level of the piriform cortex, then
this would be the only case in which a sensory system engenders
conscious perception with little or no involvement of neocortical
or thalamocortical circuits.
Second, investigators can compare the brain networks associ-
ated with (A) subliminal perception, which includes no conscious
contents, (B) conscious detection of an odorant, which includes
conscious contents and is indexed by self-report on the part of
the subject, and (C) habituation, which contains no conscious
contents. As discussed above, it remains challenging to identify
the regions whose activations correspond to the phenomenal state
of conscious detection versus the phenomenological nothingness
of habituation. When making these contrasts, one should not be
identifying the changes in neural activity associated with modula-
tions of incentive/emotional states (e.g., hunger versus satiation).
This is because, even though these states are part of the olfac-
tory experience as a whole, they are more than just the subjective
dimension of simple conscious olfactory experience. Simple con-
scious detection can occur (in some form) independent of these
state variables. Third, if olfactory contents become conscious only
when they become part of a large-scale integrative system, then
what are similar kinds of integrations that can transpire with-
out consciousness? Such a comparison may reveal that which is
special about this form of integration. Again, it has been pro-
posed (Morsella, 2005) that these conscious integrations differ
fromother formsof integration in termsof their relationship to the
voluntary action system. Fourth, if olfactory consciousness cannot
arise as a “microconsciousness” (Zeki and Bartels, 1999), but only
when taking part in a larger-scale network, then researchers can
attempt to isolate the brain rhythms associated with participation
in such a network and contrast these rhythmswith those occurring
locally (rhythms which might not be constitutive of the conscious
ﬁeld).
It is our hope that, in the spirit of this special topic on
Olfactory Consciousness across Disciplines, investigators will con-
tinue to investigate the olfactory system, the most ancient of
sensory modalities, to answer these and other questions about
the nature of consciousness, the most enigmatic phenomenon in
nature.
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